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Abstract We administer the Allais paradox questions to both a representative
sample of the Dutch population and to student subjects. Three treatments
are implemented: one with the original high hypothetical payoffs, one with
low hypothetical payoffs and a third with low real payoffs. Our key findings
are: (i) violations in the non-lab sample are systematic and a large bulk of
violations is likely to stem from non-familiarity with large payoffs, (ii) we can
identify groups of the general population that have much higher than average
violation rates; this concerns mainly the lowly educated and unemployed, and
(iii) the relative treatment differences in the population at large are accurately
predicted by the lab sample, but violation rates in all lab treatments are about
15 percentage points lower than in the corresponding non-lab treatments.
This paper was originally entitled “Allais for all: revisiting the paradox”.
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This paper presents evidence on the consistency of risk preferences with
expected utility theory in a representative population sample. We find that
consistency increases with task familiarity and is linked to several personal
characteristics such as education, income and asset holdings. Moreover, we
investigate the external validity of a laboratory experiment with a student
population that implemented the same choice problems as our household
panel study. We find that, in line with studies on other biases, deviations from
rationality observed in the lab provide a lower bound for deviations in the
population at large.
Recently, several studies have made significant progress in understanding
risk preferences in populations, making use of innovative survey methods and
field experiments (Harrison and List 2004) including game shows with large
stakes (Post et al. 2008; Andersen et al. 2008). From the perspective of these
studies, the present paper takes one step back by focussing on consistency of
risk preferences with expected utility theory in a representative subject pool—
well over 1,400 members of the CentER Panel, a representative sample of the
Dutch population. We do this by falling back on the oldest consistency test
of all—the Allais paradox (Allais 1953). Our results help to understand the
reliability and robustness of investigations into the actual distribution of risk
preferences in populations.
Our research strategy is threefold. First, we implement three different
treatments in the main experiment with the panel. We analyze the original
Allais question with payoffs of millions of Euros that, just as when Allais
asked Savage, were purely hypothetical. In our second treatment we scaled the
payments down but kept them hypothetical. Our third treatment used the same
downscaled payoffs but paid them out for real. This enables us to examine to
what extent violations are driven by lack of monetary incentives, on the one
hand, and non-familiarity with large sums of money on the other.
Second, we are able to exploit the wide range of background information
that is available for our subjects in order to study the roots of violations.1
Which personal characteristics are correlated with violations? Are violations
1Several other studies have also used the CentER panel as a subject pool. Let us briefly mention
some of these studies. Hey (2002) and Carbone (2005) analyze more complicated and sequen-
tial individual decision making tasks and do not find any background variable systematically
influencing behavior. Bellemare and Kröger (2007) study a trust game and find “that heterogeneity
in behavior is characterized by several asymmetries—men, the young and elderly, and low
educated individuals invest relatively less, but reward significantly more investments.” (p. 183) von
Gaudecker et al. (2011a) elicit risk preferences and report that older people, women, the relatively
uneducated, and those with lower income are more risk averse. For another study on individual
risk attitudes using a large and representative German sample, see Dohmen et al. (2011).
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a matter of insufficient education or limited experience with financial decision
making? Can we identify ‘problem groups’ that are, perhaps, more likely to
suffer (in particular late in life) from erroneous financial decision making?
Third, we conduct a laboratory experiment with the usual laboratory subject
population (students) employing the same design that we used in the panel
experiment. Thus, we are able to examine the external validity of a laboratory
experiment in a clear and detailed manner. In particular, we can compare
whether and how a lab study can tell us something about the population
at large.
Pursuing our threefold research strategy we are, thus, able to present
very detailed and comprehensive evidence on the Allais paradox. Our results
are useful for several practical issues: (1) Our results point to a number of
conditions that make standard theoretical predictions more likely to hold, (2)
Our results identify certain parts of the population that, due to inconsistencies,
may have difficulties in making sound financial decisions, and (3) Our results
contribute to a better understanding of what can be reliably learned from
laboratory experiments.
Along the first dimension of our research strategy we find that violations in
the original paradox are likely to be driven by very high payoffs with which,
in real life, virtually nobody has any practical experience. Violations in the
original Allais problem are twice as high as in both downscaled versions. This
effect has been observed before with student samples (Conlisk 1989); we show
that the pattern extends to the general population and across socioeconomic
characteristics. Perhaps this result is not surprising as it simply stresses that
economic theory can be expected to work much better in environments with
which agents have experience and are, thus, well-adapted. On the other
hand, we find no substantial difference between the two downscaled versions.
Whether subjects are incentivized or not, violations are much lower in both
cases.2
Along the second dimension, we are able to identify a whole array of
personal characteristics that correlate with inconsistent decision making. Edu-
cation, occupation, income and asset holdings do all correlate with inconsistent
decision making and in each case the direction of effects is as one would guess.
The better educated are more consistent and so are those in employment, those
who earn more and those who hold financial assets.
Finally, our methodological contribution reveals that the laboratory results
are rather useful in predicting behavior in a general population. First, the
relative treatment differences are precisely the same for both populations,
panel and lab. Second, as demonstrated in a number of other studies (see
Gächter et al. (2008) for a survey) the violations of standard theory observed
2For early studies of the Allais paradox see, e.g., MacCrimmon (1968), Slovic and Tversky (1974),
Allais and Hagen (1979) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979). For the effect of downscaled payoffs
see Conlisk (1989), Starmer and Sugden (1991), Harrison (1994), Burke et al. (1996), Fan (2002),
and van de Kuilen and Wakker (2006).
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in the lab provide a lower bound for violations observed in the population at
large.3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we describe
the main characteristics of the CentERpanel and introduce the experimental
design. In Section 2 we present our results obtained with the panel. We
first give a quick overview of the results and then present a more detailed
analysis, based on regression results, that also accounts for the effect of
sociodemographic characteristics. In Section 3 we introduce our lab results and
compare them to those obtained in the panel. Section 4 concludes.
1 Design and data collection
We administer the original “Allais questions,” which consist of two pairwise
lottery choices. Consider the following two choice problems. First, a subject is
asked to choose between lotteries A and A∗ where




1/100 Chance of e0
89/100 Chance of e1 Million
10/100 Chance of e5 Million





89/100 Chance of e0





90/100 Chance of e0
10/100 Chance of e5 Million
Of the four possible answers AB, A∗ B∗, AB∗, and A∗ B only the first two are
consistent with expected utility theory (henceforth, EUT) whereas the last two
are not.4 Many laboratory experiments have shown that violations of EUT are
frequent and that a larger share of subjects violating EUT chooses AB∗ instead
of A∗ B.5
3Almost all of the experiments on the Allais paradox conducted so far have used students as their
subjects. There are two notable exceptions. List and Haigh (2005) test the Allais paradox both
with students and professional traders from the Chicago Board of Trade. They report that both
students and professional traders show Allais paradox behavior, but find that traders do so to
a smaller extent. Fatas et al. (2007) use students and politicians and report similar results with
students being more prone to Allais paradox behavior.
4To see this note that by adding 0.89u(e0) − 0.89u(e1M) to both sides of the inequality
u(A) = u(e1M) > 0.01u(e0) + 0.89u(e1M) + 0.1u(e5M) = u(A∗) implies u(B) = 0.89u( e0) +
0.11u(e1M) > 0.9u(e0) + 0.1u(e5M) + 0.1u(e5M) = u(B∗).
5See, e.g., MacCrimmon (1968), Slovic and Tversky (1974), Allais and Hagen (1979), Kahneman
and Tversky (1979), Conlisk (1989), Starmer and Sugden (1991), Harrison (1994), Burke et al.
(1996) and Fan (2002).
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We have six simple treatments using a between-subjects design. To intro-
duce these treatments, consider the following lotteries over three outcomes
of monetary payoffs with probabilities as above, i.e., A = (0, 1, 0), A∗ =
(.01, .89, .10), B = (.89, .11, 0), B∗ = (.90, 0, .10). Our three treatments were
then as follows:
• Treatment HighHyp: Original Allais questions with high hypothetical
payoffs of e0, e1 million, and e5 million.
• Treatment LowHyp: Allais questions with low hypothetical payoffs of e0,
e5, and e25.
• Treatment LowReal: Allais questions with low real payoffs ofe0,e5, and
e25.
Note that the amounts of money we use in these treatments are the same
as in Conlisk (1989) with the sole difference that he used dollars instead of
euros. For all three treatments we had two sub treatments reversing the order
of decisions. As we do not find any order effects in the data we pool the data
throughout.
We collected data from a representative sample of the Dutch population.
The experiments were conducted by CentERdata—an institute for applied
economic and survey research for the social sciences—that is affiliated with
Tilburg University in the Netherlands. CentERdata carries out its survey
research mainly by using its own panel called CentERpanel. This panel is
Internet based and consists of some 2000 households in the Netherlands
which form a representative sample of the Dutch population.6 One of the
advantages of the CentERpanel is that the researcher has access to background
information for each panel member such as demographic and financial data.
Every weekend, the panel members complete a questionnaire on the Internet
from their home.
After logging on to our experiment, panel members were randomly assigned
to one of the six different treatments introduced above. After being informed
about the nature of the experiment, subjects decided whether or not to
participate—as common with many modules of the panel. For participating
subjects, the next screen introduced an example of a pair of lotteries (which
were referred to as “Options”). Subjects were told that their task would be
to express preference for one of the two lotteries and, additionally, how the
preferred lottery would be executed.7 When subjects indicated that they were
ready to start the experiment, they were, in two consecutive screens, presented
with their two Allais questions. Only after answering both Allais questions, the
two preferred lotteries were played out (by the computer) and subjects were
informed about the outcome of their two preferred lotteries. In the treatments
6For more information about the CentERpanel and the way it is administered see http://www.
uvt.nl/centerdata/en/whatwedo/thecenterpanel/.
7For more details see Appendix A which contains a translation of the screens used in the
treatments with low payoffs. Note that the experiment was administered in Dutch.
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with real monetary payments, subjects were paid according to the outcomes in
both of their preferred lotteries.8
In total 1676 members of the CentERpanel logged on to our experiment.
Of the subjects logging on, 1426 (85.1%) subjects decided to participate in our
experiment while 250 (14.9%) subjects decided not to participate. Table 1
shows descriptive statistics of our sample. The column labeled “Participation”
in Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of participating subjects in each of
the three main treatments as well as statistics of subjects who chose not to
participate in the experiment. The data in Table 1 is grouped according to
gender, age, education, occupation and income. (The column labeled “Viola-
tion” shows statistics for participating subjects violating or not violating EUT,
respectively, which we will analyze further below. It also contains tests on
the role of socioeconomic characteristics for EUT violation which will also be
discussed later.)
Concentrating on descriptive statistics for participating subjects in Table 1,
we note that by and large most variables are relatively identically distributed
across treatments. However, in some of the age and income brackets as well as
in the category savings account, there is some more variation. A comparison of
the descriptive statistics in the columns describing participating subjects with
those of non-participating shows that there are no big differences except for
the age categories. Basically, older people appear to be a little more reluctant
to participate.
Since this causes concern about sample selection problems, we ran for
all regressions reported below Heckman (1976) selection models using the
variable “Ratio” as one of the exclusion variables. The variable “Ratio”
measures the proportion of questionnaires completed by panel members in
the three months proceeding our experiment. This variable can be assumed to
affect the participation decision but not the decisions taken in the experiment.
For none of the regressions we found evidence for a selection bias.9
2 Results
2.1 Descriptives
A summary of the experimental results is given in Table 2. The table shows
both the absolute frequency of choices (left part) and the relative frequency
of choices (right part). As mentioned in the introduction, we will concentrate
8Note the following about payments in treatment LowReal. CentERdata reimburses the tele-
phone costs for filling in questionnaires by exchanging “CentERpoints” (1 CentERpoint = 0.01
Euro) to panel members’ private bank accounts four times a year. Although lotteries were
described in Euro amounts, subjects in the treatments with real monetary earnings were informed
that: “In this experiment you can earn real money that will be paid in the form of CentERpoints.”
9See Eckel and Grossman (2000), Bellemare and Kröger (2007), von Gaudecker et al. (2011b) and
Harrison et al. (2009) for more evidence on selection issues.
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Table 2 Summary of experimental results in the panel
Treatment Absolute frequency of choices Relative frequency of choices
AB A∗ B∗ AB∗ A∗ B  AB A∗ B∗ AB∗ A∗ B Violations
HighHyp 82 121 136 62 401 20.4 30.2 33.9 15.5 49.4
LowHyp 22 373 77 29 501 4.4 74.4 15.4 5.8 21.2
LowReal 22 368 97 37 524 4.2 70.2 18.5 7.1 25.6
 126 862 310 128 1426 8.8 60.4 21.7 9.0 30.7
Note: HighHyp stands for high hypothetical payoffs, LowHyp for low hypothetical payoffs, and
LowReal for low real payoffs
our analysis on the incidence of subjects’ EUT violation in all treatments.
However, we will also shortly answer the question whether violations, once
they occur, are systematic.
Violation of EUT Note that the right-most column in Table 2 indicates that
violations of EUT are observed in all treatments. In fact, we observe 49.5%,
19.6% and 25.6% violations of EUT in treatments HighHyp, LowHyp, and
LowReal, respectively. Furthermore, in all treatments we observe that the
fraction of EUT-violating AB∗ answers is higher than the fraction of EUT-
violating A∗ B answers. The Z -statistic proposed in Conlisk (1989) indicates
that the first fraction is significantly higher than the latter fraction at p < 0.001
in all treatments. An interesting question we can answer with our data is
whether the differences we report here for the aggregate data are “general”
in the sense of applying across socioeconomic attributes or whether they are
driven by only some of those attributes. The answer is provided in Tables 5,
6, 7 and 8 in Appendix B, which are structured as Table 1 and provide—for
all data and for the three treatments separately—the relative frequency of
choices for subjects with various socioeconomic attributes. We observe that
EUT violations occur across all socioeconomic attributes and that the “Allais”
pattern of more AB∗ violations than A∗ B violations is significant for most
socioeconomic attributes in all treatments (see the column labeled “Sign. of
Conlisk’s Z -statistic” in Tables 5–8 in Appendix B). We conclude that, as in
earlier studies, violations of EUT are observed and that they are systematic
in the sense that AB∗ is chosen more often than A∗ B, mostly independent
of socioeconomic background characteristics. To facilitate comparison, note
that Conlisk (1989) using a student sample for his “Basic Version” (which
is comparable to our treatment HighHyp) reports the following relative
frequencies of AB, A∗ B∗, AB∗, and A∗ B choices: 7.6%, 41.9%, 43.6%, and
6.8%. Thus, he observes EUT violation in 50.4% of the cases which compares
to 45.5% in our panel treatment HighHyp.
The ef fect of high versus small hypothetical payof fs Next consider the effect
of high versus small hypothetical payoffs on the extent of EUT violation. For
this purpose we compare the rates of EUT violations in treatments HighHyp
and LowHyp. Table 2 shows that the rate of EUT violations drops from
270 J Risk Uncertain (2012) 44:261–293
49.4% in treatment HighHyp to 19.6% in treatment LowHyp. The D-statistic
proposed in Conlisk (1989) indicates that this difference is highly significant
at p < 0.0001 (D = 9.115). Inspecting the relative frequencies of choices in
Table 2 shows that moving from HighHyp to LowHyp sharply increases the
fraction of choices consistent with expected value maximization (A∗ B∗) at the
expense of all other three possible responses. In particular, many more subjects
prefer the payoff-maximizing choice A∗ over A when (hypothetical) payoffs
become small. A possible explanation of this result is due to the fact that
subjects in treatment LowHyp can be expected to be more familiar with the
lower amounts of money leading them to make fewer mistakes.10 Again, with
our data we can check whether the result regarding the effect of varying the
(hypothetical) stake size just shown for the aggregate data also applies when
the data is broken down to various socioeconomic characteristics. Column
3 labeled “Significance of Conlisk’s D-statistic HighHyp vs LowHyp” in
Table 9 in Appendix B shows that the answer to this question is, with a few
exceptions, yes.
The ef fect of (small) real versus (small) hypothetical payof fs Finally, consider
the effect of (small) real versus (small) hypothetical payoffs on the extent
of EUT violation. To analyze this, compare the rates of EUT violation in
treatments LowHyp and LowReal. Table 2 shows that the rate of EUT
violations is 19.6% in LowHyp whereas it is 25.6% in treatment LowReal.
Thus, we see a slight increase in the share of EUT violations when we move
from (small) hypothetical to (small) real payoffs. The D-statistic in Conlisk
(1989) indicates that this difference is significant (D = −1.6716, p = 0.047).
In contrast, Harrison (1994) and Burke et al. (1996) report that the use of low
real instead of low hypothetical payoffs reduces the extent of EUT violation.
For a broader overview on how incentives affect behavior in decisions under
risk, see Camerer (1995, p. 634f). Note that the result regarding the switch from
(small) hypothetical to (small) real payoffs on the extent of EUT violation is
usually not significant when one zooms in on socioeconomic characteristics, as
shown in column 4 labeled “Significance of Conlisk’s D-statistic LowHyp vs
LowReal” in Table 9 in Appendix B.
Note that our results concerning the extent of EUT violation and the effect
of high versus small hypothetical payoffs are not entirely new. We show,
however, that they extend to a general population and across socioeconomic
characteristics. This should be of interest due to the current discussion about
the relationship between results obtained in the lab and those obtained in other
settings (see, e.g., Levitt and List 2007).
10Conlisk (1989) points out that this effect is in line with (a) Machina’s (1982) fanning out model
that predicts Allais behavior for large payoffs and (b) the observation that EUT converges to
expected payoff maximization for small payoffs. Notice, however, that this consistency argument
is not an explanation—for it leaves open why fanning occurs and is more dramatic in its
consequences with high payoffs. Non-familiarity with high payoffs is such an explanation and may,
in fact, be adequately captured by fanning out of indifference curves.
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Let us now turn to providing answers to the first of the two new and main
dimensions of our research strategy by inspecting the role of socioeconomic
background variables in subjects’ behavioral responses to the Allais questions.
Refer to Table 1 that under the heading “Violation” shows descriptive statistics
of the subsamples violating and not violating EUT as well as p-levels of χ2
tests. (For the latter, see the notes below Table 1.) Regarding gender, Table 1
reveals that women are slightly more likely to violate EUT than men. With
respect to age, Table 1 does not suggest a clear effect although we note that
the age bracket’s [35–44] relative share is higher in the panel’s subpopulation
not violating EUT. Regarding education levels, those with lower secondary
education and those subjects with a university degree stand out somewhat in
the panel. The former because they violate EUT more often and the latter
because they violate EUT less often. The most noticeable effect regarding
occupation is that those employed on a contractual basis have a higher relative
share in the subsample not violating EUT. Finally, with respect to household
income, Table 1 does not suggest a clear effect.
Moreover, refer to the rightmost column labeled “p-value, χ2” in Table 1
that shows p-levels of χ2 tests for differences between proportions of violating
and non-violating subjects in the category listed in column 1.11 The χ2 tests
indicate the strongest differences in violation behavior in the categories of
education, occupation and household income.
2.2 Econometrics and the role of socioeconomic characteristics
To test for across-treatment differences controlling for subjects’ sociodemo-
graphic characteristics and to check whether any of these characteristics are
correlated with behavior, we ran probit regressions with the variable “Violate”
as the dependent variable. “Violate” is equal to 1 if a subject’s answer to the
Allais questions violates EUT (i.e., answers A∗ B or AB∗), and is equal to 0
otherwise (i.e., answers AB or A∗ B∗). The background variables we include
in the regression are the ones shown in Table 1 above. The results are shown
in Table 3 which reports marginal effects. Regression (1) includes all data
whereas regressions (2) to (4) show results for each of the three treatments
separately. Recall from the end of Section 2 that we did not find evidence for
a selection bias due to non-response.
Let us first briefly reconsider across-treatment differences. For this purpose,
refer to regression (1) in Table 3 which includes all data and controls for back-
ground variables. Importantly, note that in regression (1) the omitted treat-
ment dummy is the one for LowHyp. Inspecting the treatment coefficients, we
note that the coefficient for HighHyp is positive and big (0.302) and highly
statistically significant whereas the coefficient of LowReal is also positive
(0.053) but rather small and only borderline significant.
11Note that for the multinomial categories in the leftmost column in Table 1, the χ2-tests check
for the joint hypothesis that the violation rates are identical across all categories.
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To analyze the effect of socioeconomic background variables economet-
rically, we examine regression (1) in Table 3. We make the following
observations.
• Controlling for other characteristics, gender and age have no significant
influence on the extent of EUT violation.12
• Regarding education, we find a strong tendency for violations to be
reduced with further education.13 Overall, there is a strong effect of higher
education that also shows in the separate specifications for both treatments
with low payoffs. In LowHyp everything that improves on primary educa-
tion goes hand in hand with reduced violations. Only in HighHyp there
is no effect of education. This suggests an interesting interaction effect of
experience with a decision domain and education. In the absence of any
experience (as in HighHyp) education on its own does little to improve
performance. Only if coupled with experience education is aligned with
consistency.
• Of the various occupational affiliations listed in Table 3, we find that the
unemployed and ‘others’ do much worse than the employed, self-employed
and freelancers.14 This is more pronounced in treatments with hypothetical
payoffs.
• Regarding income, we notice that having a higher gross monthly household
income (vis-à-vis the control group with the lowest gross monthly house-
hold income) goes along with reduced EUT violations.15 Interestingly,
this is particularly pronounced in the treatment LowReal when actual
money is at stake. (One could have conjectured that it would be the other
way round as the marginal utility of making some money and, hence, the
incentive to think a little harder might be higher for those on low incomes.
Alas, it does not work this way.)
• Finally, subjects holding assets have significantly lower EUT violations
(by about 8%) whereas subjects with a savings account have significantly
higher EUT violations (by about 5%). Maybe not surprisingly, subjects
holding assets tend to be expected value maximizers (mainly choosing
A∗ B∗) while subjects who only have a savings account display “Allais”
behavior tending toward the choice of AB∗.16
12In light of recent findings about sharply declining numeracy skills in the (British) population
above 55 (Banks 2006) this is perhaps slightly surprising.
13Wald tests indicate, however, that the effects of the education levels below university degree
listed in Table 3 are not statistically different.
14A Wald test indicates that the effect of these two occupations is not statistically different.
15Wald tests indicate that the effects of the three income variables listed in Table 3 are not
statistically different. Furthermore, controlling for household size leaves the regression results
reported in Table 3 virtually unchanged.
16To look at the effect of holding assets or a savings account more closely, we defined the variable
“only assets” which equals 1 if a subject holds assets but has no savings account (otherwise it
equals 0), the variable “only savings account” which equals 1 if a subject has a savings account
but holds no assets (otherwise it equals 0), and the variable “assets & savings account” which
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In all a picture emerges that is reminiscent of recent studies by Benjamin
et al. (2006), Burks et al. (2009) and Dohmen et al. (2010) who show that
a range of behavioral biases are correlated with (or may even stem from)
cognitive limitations and low IQ. We find that violations are more prevalent
in those who are lowly educated, unemployed, on low income, and who
have no significant asset holdings. This is, of course, particularly worrying as
imprudent financial decision making and bad planning for retirement has the
worst consequences in that group.
In Appendix C we complement the above analysis by running multinomial
logit regressions using all four answers AB, A∗ B∗, AB∗, and A∗ B, and
choosing the answer representing expected value maximization, A∗ B∗, as the
base outcome. The results (whose interpretation is less straightforward) are
shown in Tables 10, 11, 12 and 13.
3 The lab experiment
As mentioned in the introduction, the third dimension of our research strategy
is concerned with the external validity of laboratory experiments that are
typically carried out with rather homogenous subject pools. Of course, the
preceding section has shown that there are important sources of heterogeneity
in the population at large that simply cannot be detected when the subject pool
is restricted to students. The same is, of course, true for any highly selected
convenience sample. But what about the questions we analyzed first—the
effects of different treatments, the differences between high and low and real
and hypothetical payoffs? Would a lab experiment give us reliable results to
analyze such questions (as it has been implicitly assumed for a long time in the
experimental community, perhaps negligently without much testing)? To shed
more light on these issues we conducted an additional lab experiment in the
laboratory of Tilburg University using Dutch speaking student subjects drawn
from the normal subject pool.
The lab experiment was conducted in the same way as the experiment
using the CentERpanel. That is, student subjects did the experiment using
a web browser in the lab and using the same screens as the subjects in the
panel. However, there were two small exceptions. First, lab subjects received
a 10 Euro show-up fee. (Potential participants were informed about this in
equals 1 if a subject holds assets and has a savings account (otherwise it equals 0). Hence, the
reference group consists of those subjects who neither hold assets nor have a savings account.
Replacing the variables “assets” and “savings account” in regression (1) in Table 3 by the new
variables “only assets,” “only savings account,” and “assets & savings account,” leaves the other
variables of regression (1) almost unchanged (including significance levels) and shows that while
the coefficients of the variables “only assets” and “assets & savings account” are negative (−0.073
and −0.032) but insignificant, the coefficient of the variable “only savings account” is positive
(0.055) and significant at the 5% level. So it is not only the financially savvy who hold assets who
do comparatively well but also people without any savings—perhaps because, having no financial
cushion, they cannot afford making many mistakes.
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Table 4 Summary of experimental results in the lab
Treatment Absolute frequency of choices Relative frequency of choices
AB A∗ B∗ AB∗ A∗ B  AB A∗ B∗ AB∗ A∗ B Violations
HighHyp 4 41 20 5 70 5.7 58.6 28.6 7.1 35.7
LowHyp 0 75 4 0 79 0 94.9 5.1 0 5.1
LowReal 1 67 5 1 74 1.4 90.5 6.8 1.4 8.2
 5 183 29 6 223 2.2 82.1 13.0 2.7 15.7
Notes: HighHyp stands for high hypothetical payoffs, LowHyp for low hypothetical payoffs, and
LowReal for low real payoffs
the invitation E-mail.) But of course, mirroring the panel design again, only
subjects assigned to treatments with real payment had the chance to earn
additional money during the experiment. This was not announced prior to
the experiment. Second, lab subjects were not offered the choice of not
participating in the experiment once they had reported to the lab and the
experiment was started. This was done in an effort to mimic the normal
procedures in lab experiments where by reporting to the lab, a subject usually
confirms his or her decision to participate. Note that when we move from the
panel to the lab sample, both the subject pool and the environment changes.
We deliberately accepted these two simultaneous changes as our aim was to
contrast the results obtained in the panel with those obtained in a normal lab
experiment.17
After the experiment we asked subjects to fill in a questionnaire in which
we elicited some basic background information. Naturally, the information
we collected from lab subjects is very limited and cannot be compared in
scope and quality to the background information available from members of
CentERpanel. The lab experiments were conducted in December 2006 using
223 subjects in total.
As in the panel experiment we did not observe any order effects of
presenting the Allais questions, so we present only pooled data in Table 4
which shows the same information for the lab data that Table 2 showed
for the panel. We make the following observations. First, as in the panel
experiments, we observe EUT violations in all treatments, although to a much
lesser degree.18 This mirrors the main result in Gächter et al.’s (2008) meta-
study: Violations from orthodox theoretical predictions and biases observed in
the lab form a lower bound for violations and biases observed in the population
at large. Second, as in the panel, moving from high hypothetical payoffs to
low hypothetical payoffs reduces the extent of EUT violation significantly
17von Gaudecker et al. (2011b) offer an analysis of the individual effects of implementation mode
and of subject pool selection in a risk preference elicitation study and find that differences in
behavior are due to selection and not implementation mode.
18Again, we observe that the fraction of EUT-violating AB∗ answers is significantly higher than
the fraction of EUT-violating A∗ B answers in all lab treatments (p < 0.001, Conlisk’s (1989) Z -
statistic).
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Fig. 1 The share of choices
violating EUT in the panel
and the lab. Note: HighHyp
stands for high hypothetical
payoffs, LowHyp for low
hypothetical payoffs, and






















Note: Vertical line segments represent 95% confidence intervals
(p < 0.001, D = 4.881). Third, moving from low hypothetical payoffs to low
real payoffs increases the extent of EUT violation slightly but insignificantly
(p < 0.226, D = −0.7525). The similarities between the observations in the
panel and in the lab are evident.
Figure 1 shows the shares of choices violating EUT in the two subsamples.
It appears that the graph indicating the share of EUT violation in the panel
can quite accurately be obtained by shifting the graph indicating the share of
EUT violation in the lab upwards by about 15 percentage points.19 This means
that although the share of EUT violations is consistently higher in the panel
than in the lab, the comparative statics results of moving from one treatment
to another could have been reliably predicted by the lab experiments.
4 Conclusions
Using a representative sample of the Dutch population we revisit the Allais
paradox. Our main results are threefold. First, as in previous lab samples,
the violations of EUT are systematic in the population at large and much
lower when stakes are low. Second, there is considerable heterogeneity in
the population and violations are particularly prevalent among the lowly
educated, those poor in income and asset holdings, and the unemployed.
Third, comparing the panel results with a laboratory experiment we find that
the relative treatment differences are identical in the panel and the lab but
violation rates in all lab treatments are about 15 percentage points lower than
in the corresponding non-lab treatment.
Our findings appear to imply two general messages. First, laboratory exper-
iments with convenience samples of students might be more useful to study
19The difference in the extent of EUT violation between the panel and the lab is significant
for all three treatments (HighHyp: p = 0.014, D = −2.1732; LowHyp: p < 0.001; D = −5.2220;
LowReal: p < 0.001, D = −4.6935).
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relative effects rather than absolute levels (see also Levitt and List (2007) who
make a similar point in the context of social preferences). When it comes
to the absolute measurement of behavior, it appears that lab results will
draw a too optimistic picture. The population at large, it turns out, is less
consistent with EUT than student samples are. Second, our results suggest
that the predictive power of EUT in a general population is correlated with
socioeconomic characteristics. In particular, parts of the population that are
more likely to experience economic hardship are less consistent.
Of course, there exists a large literature on non-expected utility theo-
ries such as Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory or Machina’s
(1982) fanning-out theory (both of which can explain the Allais paradox)
or Viscusi’s (1989) prospective reference theory which predicts the paradox.
Earlier laboratory experiments (see Camerer (1995) or Starmer (2000) for
surveys) have documented the Allais paradox in student samples. Our paper
highlights that, if anything, these studies underestimate the true prevalence of
the paradox in general populations and indicates how violations are correlated
with observable characteristics.
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Appendix A: Instructions (Translation)
The experiment was administered in Dutch. Here we give a translation of the
screens presented in treatment LowHyp and [LowReal]
Screen 1:
This research is conducted by researchers of Tilburg University and Uni-
versity College London. The questionnaire consists of two choice problems in
which you will be asked to make a choice between two situations. Based on
your choices and luck you may win an amount of money. Please note: In this
experiment all amounts are hypothetical, in reality you cannot win any money.
[In LowReal: In this experiment you can earn real money that will be paid in
the form of CentERpoints.]
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If you do not want to participate as a matter of principle, you can indicate
this below. You will then go directly to the end of the questionnaire.
© I continue with the questionnaire.




You will shortly be presented with two questions. You will be asked to make
a choice between two options which provide you with different chances to win
something. Please see an example of such a situation here below. In the first
option you have a chance of 80% to win nothing and a chance of 20% to win
10 Euro. The second option provides you with a chance of 20% of nothing and
a chance of 80% of winning 20 Euro.
OPTION 1: 80% chance nothing (if number is between 1 and 80) and
20% chance 10 euro (if number is between 81 and 100)
OPTION 2: 20% chance nothing (if number is between 1 and 20) and
80% chance 20 euro (if number is between 21 and 100)
We would like to know whether you prefer Option 1 or Option 2 (in these
instructions you don’t have to choose yet). After you have made the choice,
the computer will play out the option you chose. The computer generates a
random number that is between 1 and 100. The chance distribution of the
chosen option then defines how much you win with this number.
For example: in the Option 1 above you get nothing if the computer
generates a number between 1 and 80 (this is indicated above in Option 1 in
brackets), but if the computer generates a number between 81 and 100 you will
get 10 Euro. In Option 2 you get nothing if the computer generates a number
between 1 and 20, but with a number between 21 and 100 you win 20 Euro.
As already mentioned, it concerns hypothetical amounts here, in reality you
cannot win any money. [In LowReal: If you win something then this amount
will be added to your account of CentERpoints.]
If you are ready to start the experiment, press “Continue.”
Continue
Screen 3:
Which of the following two options do you prefer?
OPTION A: certainty of 5 euro (if number is between 1 and 100)
and
OPTION B: 1% chance of nothing (if number is 1) and
89% chance of 5 euro (if number is between 2 and 90)
and
10% chance of 25 euro (if number is between 91 and 100)





Which of the following two options do you prefer?
OPTION C: 89% chance of nothing (if number is between 1 and 89)
and
11% chance of 5 euro (if number is between 90 and 100)
OPTION D: 90% chance of nothing (if number is between 1 and 90)
and





You have now made the two decisions. Press “Continue” to see the results
of the options you chose.
Continue
Screen 6:
In the first question (option A or B) you have chosen Option X ([description
of the chosen option]). The computer generated the number [random number].
Thus, you have won [in treatment LowHyp: the hypothetical] amount of [...]
euro with this option.
In the second question (option C or D) you have chosen Option Y ([de-
scription of the chosen option]). The computer generated the number [random
number]. Thus, you have won the [in treatment LowHyp: the hypothetical]
amount of [...] euro with this option.
In total you have won the [in treatment LowHyp: the hypothetical] amount
of [...] euro in this experiment.
Continue
Screen 7:




Screen 8 [In case the answer to the question on Screen 7 was Yes.] :
You can type in your comments below.
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Table 9 Test results for violations of EUT across treatments
Category Significance of Conlisk’s D-statistic
HighHyp vs LowHyp LowHyp vs LowReal
Gender Female n.s. n.s.
Male ∗∗∗ ∗∗
Age Age 16–24 ∗∗ n.s.
Age 25–34 ∗ n.s.
Age 35–44 ∗∗∗ n.s.
Age 45–54 ∗∗∗ ∗∗
Age 55–64 ∗∗ n.s.
Age 65+ ∗∗∗ n.s.
Education Primary education n.s. ∗
Lower secondary education ∗∗∗ n.s.
Higher secondary education ∗∗∗ n.s.
Intermediate vocational training ∗∗∗ ∗∗
Higher vocational training ∗∗∗ n.s.
University degree ∗∗∗ n.s.
Occupation Employed (contract) ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
Freelance or self-employed n.s. ∗
Unemployed ∗ n.s.
Student ∗∗ n.s.
Works in own household n.s. n.s.
Retired ∗∗∗ n.s.
Other occupation ∗∗∗ n.s.
Household HH gross income ≤ e2250 ∗∗∗ ∗
Income HH gross income e2251−e3130 ∗∗ n.s.
HH gross income e3131−e4350 ∗∗∗ n.s.
HH gross income ≥ e4351 ∗∗ ∗
Holds assets Yes ∗∗∗ n.s.
No ∗∗∗ ∗∗
Has savings Yes ∗∗∗ n.s.
Account No ∗∗∗ ∗
Notes: HighHyp stands for high hypothetical payoffs, LowHyp for low hypothetical payoffs,
and LowReal for low real payoffs. The columns labeled “Sign. of Conlisk’s D-statistic” indicate
significance for the test that violations of EUT are statistically significantly different across the two
treatments listed in columns 3 and 4. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively; n.s. indicates non-significance
Continue
Screen 9:
This is the end of the questionnaire. Thank you for your participation.
Appendix B: Relative frequencies of choices depending on socioeconomic
characteristics
In Tables 5–9 we report the relative frequency of choices and the re-
sults of additional tests depending on socioeconomic characteristics. We
do this for the pooled data (Table 5) and the three treatments separately
(Tables 5–8), and for pair-wise across-treatment tests (Table 9). The various
tests are described in the notes to the tables.
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Appendix C: Results of multinomial logit regressions
In this appendix, we report the results of multinomial logit regressions on all
four answers AB, A∗ B∗, AB∗, and A∗ B, using expected value maximization,
A∗ B∗, as the base outcome and using the variables listed in column 1 in Table
3 as regressors. We perform multinomial logit regressions for the pooled data
and for the three treatments separately. The results are reported in Tables 10
(all data) and Tables 11–13 (treatments HighHyp, LowHyp, and LowReal). In
these tables we report the relative risks of choosing outcome AB, AB∗ or A∗ B
over the base outcome A∗ B∗. That is, the three columns in Tables 10–13 show,
respectively, the ratios P(answer = AB)/P(answer = A∗ B∗), P(answer =
A∗ B)/P(answer = A∗ B∗), and P(answer = AB∗)/P(answer = A∗ B∗), where
P(.) denotes the probability of choosing a given answer. The tables should
be read as follows. Refer, for example, to Table 10 that reports the results
Table 10 Results of a multinomial logistic regression (all treatments)
All treatments Answer
Base outcome: A∗ B∗ AB AB∗ A∗ B
Constant 0.189∗ (−1.85) 0.547 (−0.99) 0.839 (−0.24)
HighHyp 14.116∗∗∗ (9.57) 6.209∗∗∗ (9.91) 8.665∗∗∗ (8.19)
LowReal 1.043 (0.13) 1.309 (1.55) 1.398 (1.25)
Female 2.045∗∗∗ (3.00) 1.297 (1.64) 0.929 (−0.32)
Age 25–34 0.726 (−0.44) 0.986 (−0.03) 0.175∗ (−1.75)
Age 35–44 0.654 (−0.57) 0.810 (−0.42) 0.197∗∗∗ (−2.73)
Age 45–54 0.877 (−0.18) 1.148 (0.28) 0.363∗ (−1.77)
Age 55–64 1.381 (0.43) 1.201 (0.36) 0.297∗∗ (−2.01)
Age 65+ 1.441 (0.44) 0.895 (−0.20) 0.173∗∗ (−2.49)
Lower second. edu. 0.571 (−1.28) 0.716 (−1.03) 0.927 (−0.17)
Higher second. edu. 0.449 (−1.64) 0.487∗∗ (−2.03) 0.746 (−0.62)
Intermed. voc. training 0.418∗ (−1.86) 0.784 (−0.72) 0.788 (−0.51)
Higher voc. training 0.260∗∗∗ (−2.77) 0.683 (−1.12) 0.716 (−0.71)
University degree 0.175∗∗∗ (−2.95) 0.475∗ (−1.96) 0.093∗∗∗ (−2.85)
Employed (contract) 0.811 (−0.51) 0.479∗∗∗ (−2.59) 0.538 (−1.54)
Freelance or self-empl. 1.319 (0.46) 0.441∗ (−1.72) 0.282 (−1.51)
Unemployed 0.000 (−0.02) 0.871 (−0.26) 1.437 (0.55)
Student 1.196∗ (−1.77) 0.622 (−0.88) 0.259∗∗ (−1.99)
Works in own household 0.861 (−0.33) 0.645 (−1.34) 0.808 (−0.46)
Retired 0.396∗ (−1.68) 0.711 (−0.91) 1.280 (0.47)
HH gr. inc. e2251–e3130 0.966 (−0.12) 0.820 (−1.00) 0.432∗∗∗ (−2.95)
HH gr. inc. e3131–e4350 0.670 (−1.32) 0.534∗∗∗ (−3.00) 0.507∗∗ (−2.50)
HH gr. inc. ≥ e4351 0.566∗ (−1.71) 0.728 (−1.50) 0.349∗∗∗ (−3.22)
Assets 1.032 (0.10) 0.666∗ (−1.90) 0.578∗ (−1.65)
Savings account 0.803 (−0.98) 1.306∗ (1.79) 1.187 (0.81)
No. of observations 1424
Log likelihood −1321.24
Relative risk ratios are reported
Notes: HighHyp stands for high hypothetical payoffs, LowHyp for low hypothetical payoffs, and
LowReal for low real payoffs. Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Omitted categories are treatment LowHyp; age interval [16–24]; primary education;
“other” occupation; household gross income smaller or equal to e2250
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Table 11 Results of a multinomial logistic regression (Treatment HighHyp)
Treatment HighHyp Answer
Base outcome: A∗ B∗ AB AB∗ A∗ B
Constant 4.663 (1.069) 3.059 (0.875) 2.670 (0.589)
Female 1.997∗∗ (2.003) 0.991 (−0.031) 0.992 (−0.022)
Age 25–34 0.324 (−0.956) 1.408 (0.324) 0.218 (−1.334)
Age 35–44 0.129∗ (−1.736) 0.542 (−0.580) 0.045∗∗∗ (−2.657)
Age 45–54 0.228 (−1.253) 0.835 (−0.171) 0.139∗ (−1.739)
Age 55–64 0.382 (−0.801) 0.905 (−0.090) 0.075∗∗ (−2.146)
Age 65+ 0.134 (−1.484) 0.675 (−0.322) 0.045∗∗ (−2.283)
Lower second. edu. 0.287∗ (−1.733) 0.719 (−0.475) 4.506 (1.278)
Higher second. edu. 0.390 (−1.229) 0.853 (−0.216) 3.460 (1.014)
Intermed. voc. training 0.306 (−1.580) 0.965 (−0.050) 2.731 (0.819)
Higher voc. training 0.276∗ (−1.708) 1.484 (−0.552) 4.847 (1.303)
University degree 0.269 (−1.587) 1.249 (0.295) 1.029 (0.021)
Employed (contract) 1.441 (0.491) 0.417 (−1.466) 0.580 (−0.701)
Freelance or self-empl. 2.323 (0.887) 0.122∗∗ (−2.085) 0.172 (−1.321)
Unemployed 0.000 (−0.025) 0.397 (−0.774) 0.878 (−0.099)
Student 0.186 (−1.215) 0.538 (−0.573) 0.114 (−1.635)
Works in own household 1.838 (0.752) 0.506 (−0.997) 0.589 (−0.594)
Retired 1.735 (0.599) 0.676 (−0.520) 2.349 (0.909)
HH gr. inc. e2251–e3130 1.766 (1.232) 1.389 (0.810) 0.646 (−0.882)
HH gr. inc. e3131–e4350 0.789 (−0.509) 0.465∗ (−1.843) 0.429∗ (−1.726)
HH gr. inc. ≥ e4351 0.617 (−0.959) 0.736 (−0.728) 0.412 (−1.631)
Assets 1.051 (0.115) 0.648 (−1.159) 0.620 (−0.940)
Savings account 0.898 (−0.321) 1.334 (0.991) 1.652 (1.378)
No. of observations 400
Log likelihood −490.83
Relative risk ratios are reported
Notes: HighHyp stands for high hypothetical payoffs. Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Omitted categories are treatment LowHyp; age interval [16–
24]; primary education; “other” occupation; household gross income smaller or equal to e2250.
One occupation observation missing
on the pooled data. Since the omitted treatment is LowHyp, the coefficient
14.116 in the second column of this table means that by moving from
treatment LowHyp to treatment HighHyp, the relative risk, P(answer =
AB)/P(answer = A∗ B∗), of choosing answer AB over answer A∗ B∗ is equal
to 14.116. Similarly, by moving from the omitted age category 16–24 to age
category 25–34, the relative risk, P(answer = AB)/P(answer = A∗ B∗), of
choosing answer AB over answer A∗ B∗ is equal to 0.726.
Inspecting the results of the multinomial logit regressions for the three
treatments in Tables 11–13, the most salient feature seems to be that for the
different treatments different categories of background characteristics have a
significant effect on the relative risk of choosing one answer over the base
answer A∗ B∗. For treatment HighHyp we note that it is most age categories
that show a significant correlation with the relative risk of choosing answer
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Table 12 Results of a multinomial logistic regression (Treatment LowHyp)
Treatment LowHyp Answer
Base outcome: A∗ B∗ AB AB∗ A∗ B
Constant 0.000 (−0.013) 0.793 (−0.222) 0.545 (−0.448)
Female 1.519 (0.764) 1.710∗ (1.739) 0.926 (−0.157)
Age 25–34 9.0e+05 (0.013) 0.908 (−0.109) 2.132 (0.664)
Age 35–44 1.3e+06 (0.013) 1.128 (0.137) 0.256 (−0.902)
Age 45–54 6.1e+05 (0.012) 0.894 (−0.127) 1.249 (0.187)
Age 55–64 1.8e+06 (0.013) 1.520 (0.468) 1.091 (0.068)
Age 65+ 2.6e+06 (0.014) 0.449 (−0.813) 0.358 (−0.717)
Lower second. edu. 0.771 (−0.288) 0.307∗∗ (−2.271) 0.434 (−1.150)
Higher second. edu. 0.515 (−0.654) 0.203∗∗∗ (−2.638) 0.436 (−1.049)
Intermed. voc. training 0.269 (−1.259) 0.307∗∗ (−2.112) 0.439 (−1.022)
Higher voc. training 0.078∗ (−1.883) 0.332∗ (−1.959) 0.271 (−1.507)
University degree 0.000 (−0.014) 0.197∗∗ (−2.347) 0.000 (−0.016)
Employed (contract) 0.257∗∗ (−2.117) 0.353∗∗ (−2.038) 0.445 (−1.024)
Freelance or self-empl. 0.348 (−0.852) 0.479 (−0.813) 0.000 (−0.008)
Unemployed 0.000 (−0.007) 0.891 (−0.139) 1.298 (0.193)
Student 0.000 (−0.011) 0.515 (−0.661) 1.093 (0.070)
Works in own household 0.102∗∗∗ (−2.669) 0.749 (−0.507) 0.674 (−0.420)
Retired 0.031∗∗∗ (−2.668) 1.449 (0.574) 2.733 (0.976)
HH gr. inc. e2251–e3130 0.687 (−0.640) 0.884 (−0.336) 0.460 (−1.249)
HH gr. inc. e3131–e4350 0.424 (−1.185) 0.742 (−0.776) 0.958 (−0.083)
HH gr. inc. ≥ e4351 0.276 (−1.479) 0.701 (−0.901) 0.311 (−1.609)
Assets 0.299 (−1.082) 1.011 (0.029) 0.603 (−0.619)
Savings account 0.897 (−0.214) 1.728∗ (1.942) 0.607 (−1.171)
No. of observations 500
Log likelihood −346.80
Relative risk ratios are reported
Notes: LowHyp stands for low hypothetical payoffs. Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Omitted categories are treatment LowHyp; age interval [16–
24]; primary education; “other” occupation; household gross income smaller or equal to e2250.
One occupation observation missing
Table 13 Results of a multinomial logistic regression (Treatment LowReal)
Treatment LowReal Answer
Base outcome: A∗ B∗ AB AB∗ A∗ B
Constant 0.000 (−0.011) 0.922 (−0.075) 1.986 (0.493)
Female 2.012 (1.296) 1.227 (0.772) 0.707 (−0.820)
Age 25–34 7.5e+04 (0.007) 0.340 (−1.251) 0.120∗ (−1.835)
Age 35–44 4.0e+05 (0.009) 0.325 (−1.235) 0.325 (−0.978)
Age 45–54 4.5e+05 (0.009) 0.684 (−0.431) 0.229 (−1.274)
Age 55–64 3.4e+05 (0.008) 0.462 (−0.850) 0.270 (−1.101)
Age 65+ 3.6e+06 (0.010) 0.945 (−0.055) 0.241 (−1.003)
Lower second. edu. 2.383 (0.773) 1.910 (1.128) 0.784 (−0.347)
Higher second. edu. 0.724 (−0.247) 0.937 (−0.104) 0.825 (−0.256)
Intermed. voc. training 1.099 (0.073) 2.227 (1.323) 1.405 (0.464)
Higher voc. training 0.873 (−0.110) 1.131 (0.199) 0.816 (−0.267)
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Table 13 (continued)
Treatment LowReal Answer
Base outcome: A∗ B∗ AB AB∗ A∗ B
University degree 0.000 (−0.011) 0.556 (−0.831) 0.000 (−0.014)
Employed (contract) 2.672 (0.830) 0.573 (−1.177) 0.576 (−0.801)
Freelance or self-empl. 0.000 (−0.006) 1.005 (0.007) 0.592 (−0.422)
Unemployed 0.000 (−0.003) 1.009 (0.010) 1.976 (0.630)
Student 0.000 (−0.008) 0.365 (−1.048) 0.215 (−1.153)
Works in own household 1.690 (0.435) 0.612 (−0.899) 1.212 (0.253)
Retired 0.277 (−0.955) 0.323 (−1.637) 0.391 (−0.911)
HH gr. inc. e2251–e3130 0.415 (−1.284) 0.542∗ (−1.823) 0.250∗∗∗ (−2.647)
HH gr. inc. e3131–e4350 0.360 (−1.553) 0.450∗∗ (−2.312) 0.344∗∗ (−2.216)
HH gr. inc. ≥ e4351 0.768 (−0.393) 0.764 (−0.781) 0.243∗∗ (−2.313)
Assets 1.116 (0.153) 0.426∗∗ (−1.993) 0.624 (−0.790)
Savings account 0.687 (−0.740) 1.083 (0.318) 1.207 (0.491)
No. of observations 524
Log likelihood −409.60
Relative risk ratios are reported
Notes: LowReal stands for low real payoffs. Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Omitted categories are treatment LowHyp; age interval [16–24]; primary
education; “other” occupation; household gross income smaller or equal to e2250
A∗ B over answer A∗ B∗ (columns labeled “A∗ B” in Table 11). For treatment
LowHyp we observe that most of the occupation variables are significantly
correlated with the relative risk of choosing answer AB∗ over answer A∗ B∗
(column labeled “AB∗” in Table 12). Finally, for treatment LowReal we
infer that most of all the household gross income variables have a significant
correlation with the relative risk of choosing answer A∗ B over answer A∗ B∗
(column “A∗ B” in Table 13).
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